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FEELING INADEQUATE?: THE STRUGGLE 
TO DEFINE THE SAVINGS CLAUSE IN  
28 U.S.C. § 2255 
Abstract: Federal prisoners who wish to mount a collateral challenge to 
their conviction or sentence are generally prohibited from making their 
claim via the writ of habeas corpus and are forced to proceed under a 
similar procedure set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After the passage of the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which added sig-
nificant restrictions to § 2255 review but not to habeas review, that prohi-
bition can be the difference between freedom and incarceration for a 
federal prisoner serving a term of incarceration based on an illegal con-
viction or sentence. There is, however, a provision within § 2255, known 
as the savings clause, that contains an exception to the habeas bar where 
the remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the le-
gality of the detention.” The courts of appeals have split on the proper 
test to govern the application of the savings clause. This Note examines 
each of the tests that has been adopted by the circuits and shows how 
each is problematic when analyzed in light of the text of § 2255, the legis-
lative intent behind the passage of the AEDPA, and the constitutional 
considerations inherent in post-conviction review. This Note goes on to 
posit a new test for the application of the savings clause that more effec-
tively navigates those competing interests. 
Introduction 
 In 1995, police arrested Ezell Gilbert when a search of his car re-
vealed large amounts of crack cocaine and marijuana.1 A federal in-
dictment followed, and, in 1996, Gilbert pleaded guilty in federal court 
to possession of the drugs with intent to distribute.2 Gilbert’s sentenc-
ing range under the federal sentencing guidelines was twelve and one-
half to fifteen and one-half years.3 The court, however, did not apply 
                                                                                                                      
1 Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
2 Id. at 1298. 
3 Id. at 1300. During this period, imposing a sentence within the guideline range was 
mandatory. Id. In 2005, in United States v. Booker, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial required severance of the statutory provision making 
imposition of a sentence within the guidelines range mandatory. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
The upshot of this development for Gilbert is, if resentenced, he could be subject to a 
sentence that is as long, if not longer, than his current sentence, as judges are now free to 
depart from the sentencing range. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1304. 
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that range to Gilbert because it found that a sentencing enhancement 
contained within the sentencing guidelines applied to him.4 The en-
hancement increased his sentencing range under the guidelines to 
twenty-four and one-half to thirty and one-half years, nearly doubling 
the unenhanced range.5 
 Gilbert’s sentence was enhanced by the Career Offender en-
hancement, which applies to sentences for certain crimes where the 
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for either “crimes of 
violence” or controlled substance offenses.6 Gilbert objected at sen-
tencing that his prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon did 
not constitute a prior “crime of violence,” which was required for the 
application of the enhancement in his case.7 The trial court overruled 
his objection, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed his conviction and sentencing.8 
                                                                                                                     
 Then, in 2008, ten years after Gilbert’s appeal, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Begay v. United States, held that driving while intoxicated was 
not a “violent felony” under a similar sentencing statute.9 This holding 
raised doubt about the viability of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Gil-
bert’s case.10 Ultimately, in 2008, in United States v. Archer, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that carrying a concealed weapon was not a “crime of vio-
lence” under the sentencing enhancement applied to Gilbert, explicitly 
overruling the decision in Gilbert’s appeal.11 
 In 2009, Gilbert filed a motion to be resentenced under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.12 He cited Archer, in which the Eleventh Circuit admitted that it 
erred in applying the sentencing enhancement to him.13 Gilbert, how-
ever, would not receive a new sentencing hearing.14 His motion was de-
nied due to the restrictions put in place by the Antiterrorism and Effec-
 
4 Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1299–1300. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 1299; U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (1995). 
7 Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1299–1300. 
8 Id. at 1300. 
9 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008). The Court in Begay interpreted the term “violent felony” in 
the Armed Career Criminal Act. Id. at 139 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006)). 
10 See United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (recognizing the 
Supreme Court’s abrogation of Gilbert). 
11 Id. In Archer, the Eleventh Circuit used the Court’s holding in Begay to inform its in-
terpretation of “crime of violence” under the Career Offender enhancement, noting that 
the definitions of that term and “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act are 
“virtually identical.” Id. at 1352. 
12 Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1301. 
13 Id. at 1301–02. 
14 Id. at 1295. 
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tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).15 The AEDPA added restric-
tions to § 2255 that made it very difficult for federal prisoners to get judi-
cial review of their conviction or sentence if they, like Gilbert, had al-
ready challenged their conviction or sentence after their direct appeal.16 
 Gilbert’s argument hinged on the application of the savings clause 
contained within § 2255, one of the very few exceptions by which a pris-
oner can avoid the restrictions added by the AEDPA.17 The savings 
clause allows federal prisoners to file a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus when the remedy provided by § 2255 is deemed “inadequate or in-
effective.”18 The scope of “inadequate or ineffective” is unclear from the 
text of the statute and has become a significant source of litigation.19 
The importance of a correct resolution to the savings clause problem 
cannot be overstated, as illustrated by the case of Ezell Gilbert, who will 
likely serve the entirety of his enhanced sentence despite a judicial ad-
mission that the sentencing guidelines were erroneously applied.20 
 Part I of this Note discusses the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as an 
alternative to the writ of habeas corpus and the fundamental changes 
the enactment of the AEDPA brought to that statute.21 Part II considers 
attempts by the courts of appeals to define the term “inadequate or inef-
fective,” the operative language of the savings clause.22 Part III argues 
that all of the tests adopted by the courts of appeals are fundamentally 
flawed when weighed against the text of § 2255, the legislative intent 
that motivated the enactment of the AEDPA, and the constitutional con-
siderations inherent in post-conviction review.23 Finally, Part IV proposes 
a new test to govern the operation of the savings clause that avoids the 
pitfalls of the tests adopted by the courts of appeals.24 
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. at 1302; see Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010)). 
16 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive 
Claims of Innocence: A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals 
Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. Miami L. Rev. 75, 90 
(2005). 
17 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1295; see Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 85–86, 
90. 
18 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
19 Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1307; see Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction Relief 
Alternatives and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 171, 
190 (2003). 
20 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1330 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
21 See infra notes 25–89 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 90–191 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 192–294 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 295–354 and accompanying text. 
356 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:353 
I. The Legislative History of the Savings Clause and the AEDPA 
Sea Change 
 The statute that governs collateral review of federal convictions 
and sentences is 28 U.S.C. § 2255.25 This Part will trace the history of 
habeas corpus and the legislative history leading to the enactment of 
§ 2255 as they are relevant to the savings clause.26 This Part will also 
discuss the AEDPA and the significant changes that that legislation 
brought to § 2255.27 
 For federal prisoners like Ezell Gilbert who wish to challenge their 
federal conviction or sentence after the denial of a direct appeal, or the 
failure to file one, the process is known as collateral review.28 The term 
“collateral review” broadly refers to review of a criminal conviction or 
sentence that is separate from the direct appeal process.29 Included 
within the broad umbrella of collateral review is § 2255, which Gilbert 
employed to challenge his sentence.30 Possibly the best-known example 
of collateral review is the writ of habeas corpus and, in fact, the terms 
“collateral review” and “habeas corpus” are often used interchangea-
bly.31 Section 2255 is distinct from habeas corpus, but is linked in its 
creation and scope to the ancient writ.32 Accordingly, a brief examina-
tion of the history of habeas corpus informs the analysis of collateral 
review generally and § 2255 specifically.33 
 The origins of the writ of habeas corpus can be traced back to the 
emergence of the rule of law in England.34 Originally, the writ served 
to safeguard the jurisdiction of the King’s courts over his subjects to 
ensure compliance with royal law.35 Over time, however, the writ of ha-
beas corpus became an important tool to ensure the legality of deten-
tion by the sovereign.36 As such, the framers of the U.S. Constitution 
saw the writ as an important check on government power as well as a 
                                                                                                                      
25 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
26 See infra notes 28–69 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 70–89 and accompanying text. 
28 See Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1284 (2011). 
29 Id. 
30 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
31 See Wall, 131 S. Ct. at 1284. 
32 See id.; United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 214–17 (1952). 
33 See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 373–74 (2d Cir. 1997). 
34 Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century, 
at vii (2011). 
35 Id. at 3. 
36 Id. 
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guarantee of individual liberty.37 The inclusion of the writ, embodied in 
the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, stands as a testament to the 
framers’ view of the centrality of the writ to a free society.38 
                                                                                                                     
 The inclusion of the Suspension Clause in the Constitution also 
makes clear that collateral review has a constitutional dimension in that 
it must comply with that provision.39 But, more generally, the constitu-
tional implications of collateral review reach beyond the Suspension 
Clause to other provisions of the Constitution.40 The Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment can be implicated by requiring that 
convictions and sentences be the result of fundamentally fair proc-
esses.41 Equal protection of the law can also be implicated if a collateral 
review procedure distinguishes between two classes of individuals with-
out justification.42 Additionally, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment can be implicated if a collateral re-
view procedure fails to provide a remedy for a wrongfully incarcerated 
prisoner.43 
 
37 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008). 
38 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”); see Hack, supra note 19, at 174; Mark D. Pezold, Note, When to Be a Court of Last Resort: 
The Search for a Standard of Review for the Suspension Clause, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 243, 248 (2010). 
39 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1997). 
40 See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–80 & nn.21–22. The Suspension Clause, by its terms at 
least, does not grant an affirmative right. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. Rather, the text 
of the clause sets out a limitation on Congress, albeit one that implies a right. Larry W. 
Yackle, Federal Courts: Habeas Corpus 14 (2d ed. 2010). From the time of the Mar-
shall Court, it has been thought that the Suspension Clause, in itself, is not sufficient to 
grant federal courts jurisdiction over habeas claims, and thus Congress must grant jurisdic-
tion by statute. Id. at 15–16. Accordingly, there are often two questions in a collateral re-
view case: (1) the statutory question of interpreting and ensuring compliance with the 
statutory framework, and (2) whether, given that statutory framework, the Suspension 
Clause is implicated. See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting). Occasionally, 
the two issues can fade into one another where courts use the possibility of a Suspension 
Clause violation to inform the interpretation of the statute. Yackle, supra, at 16. This Note 
focuses on the interpretation of a statutory habeas provision, although, as just mentioned, 
collateral review statutes are often informed by constitutional imperatives. See id. 
41 U.S. Const. amend. V; see Triestman, 124 F.3d at 379. 
42 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Triestman, 124 F.3d at 379 n.22. Although the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by its terms applies only to the states, in 
1954, in Bolling v. Sharpe, the U.S. Supreme Court held the right to equal protection under 
the law to be implicit in due process of the law, which is protected against federal en-
croachment by the Fifth Amendment. 347 U.S. 497, 498–500 (1954). 
43 U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see Triestman, 124 F.3d at 379. 
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A. The Enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
 The history of § 2255 has its roots in the expansion of the scope of 
habeas corpus in the nineteenth century.44 In the context of federal 
criminal convictions, the early exercise of habeas review was limited to 
ensuring that the sentencing court had proper jurisdiction.45 Congress, 
however, expanded habeas review in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.46 
In the decades after its enactment, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
language of the 1867 Act to provide much more comprehensive review 
than earlier conceptions of habeas corpus provided.47 
 Section 2255 came about as a response to this expansion of the 
scope of habeas review.48 Under the 1867 Act, as under the current ha-
beas statute, writs of habeas corpus had to be filed in the federal district 
court having jurisdiction over the prisoner’s place of confinement.49 
The combination of this jurisdictional requirement along with more 
comprehensive habeas review resulted in habeas petitions dispropor-
tionately clogging the dockets of those federal courts with federal pris-
ons within their territorial jurisdiction.50 
 The Judicial Conference of the United States looked to remedy 
this problem beginning in 1942.51 The Judicial Conference submitted a 
                                                                                                                      
44 See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212. 
45 See Yackle, supra note 40, at 30. 
46 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–86; King & Hoffmann, su-
pra note 34, at 9. From the founding until Reconstruction, statutory habeas corpus was 
interpreted according to a conservative view of English common law. Yackle, supra note 
40, at 30–31. This interpretation limited habeas review solely to a review of jurisdiction. See 
id. at 30. The 1867 Act conferred on federal courts the power to grant the writ “in all cases 
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or 
of any treaty or law of the United States.” Id. at 31 (quoting the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867, 14 Stat. 385, 385). The Supreme Court interpreted this language to allow for a much 
broader review of criminal convictions and sentences. King & Hoffmann, supra note 34, at 
108–09. The modern successor to the 1867 Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2010). 
47 King & Hoffmann, supra note 34, at 108–09; see, e.g., House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 
(1945) (stating that issuing the writ is appropriate where a prisoner is being held in viola-
tion of his or her constitutional rights and the writ is the only means of enforcing those 
rights (citing Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1942)), overruled by Hohn v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 330–31 (1915) (noting that 
the 1867 Act provided for a “more searching investigation” than the “bare legal review” 
under the common law). 
48 King & Hoffmann, supra note 34, at 108–10. 
49 Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212–13. 
50 Id. at 214 n.18. The Supreme Court in Hayman noted that, at the time of § 2255’s 
enactment, sixty-three percent of habeas petitions filed by federal prisoners were filed in 
only five district courts. Id. 
51 Id. at 214. 
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proposed bill to Congress that established a procedure requiring fed-
eral prisoners to challenge their conviction in the court that sentenced 
them, as opposed to the court with territorial jurisdiction over their 
place of confinement.52 Congress acted on the proposed bill in 1948, 
creating 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which included portions of the bill proposed 
by the Judicial Conference.53 Reflecting on this history, the Supreme 
Court concluded that Congress enacted § 2255 as a practical remedy to 
the difficulties that resulted from the jurisdictional requirement of the 
writ of habeas corpus.54 As a mere practical alternative, the Supreme 
Court determined that the scope of the review provided by § 2255 was 
the same as that provided by the general habeas corpus statute.55 In 
another case, the Court noted that nothing in the legislative history of 
§ 2255 indicated that Congress intended to alter the scope of review 
from the traditional habeas procedure.56 
 Section 2255 provides a procedure whereby a prisoner in custody 
under sentence of a federal court may move the court to “vacate, set 
aside or correct [a] sentence.”57 The motion must be filed in the court 
that sentenced the prisoner, not the district of detention as in a habeas 
petition.58 Section 2255 also requires that federal prisoners detained 
upon criminal convictions use § 2255 as the vehicle to challenge their 
conviction or sentence by explicitly prohibiting federal district courts 
from hearing habeas corpus petitions filed by such prisoners.59 Thus, 
habeas review, which became much less restrictive than § 2255 after the 
passage of the AEDPA, is closed to federal prisoners.60 This prohibition, 
however, contains one exception, known as the savings clause, which 
allows a prisoner to file a habeas petition when the remedy provided by 
§ 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his deten-
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. at 214–15. 
53 Id. at 206, 218; see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 
967–68 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
54 Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219. 
55 Id. at 217, 219; see also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 221 (1969) (noting 
that the history of the statute suggests that the legislation was not meant to restrict the 
scope of review). 
56 Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 222. 
57 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
58 Id. 
59 28 U.S.C. § 225 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
60 In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1998). Habeas corpus remains available 
as the procedure for federal prisoners challenging the execution of their sentence, as dis-
tinguished from those challenging the basis of conviction and imposition of a sentence. 
Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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tion.”61 So for those prisoners for whom § 2255 applies, the only re-
course to habeas corpus is via the savings clause, and, in turn, the sav-
ings clause only applies when the remedy provided by § 2255 is “inade-
quate or ineffective.”62 
 The savings clause was included in § 2255 when it was first enacted 
in 1948.63 The language of the savings clause as enacted differs from 
the language in the proposed bill recommended by the Judicial Con-
ference that served as the basis of § 2255.64 The proposed bill prohib-
ited a prisoner from filing a habeas petition except when it was not 
“practicable to determine his rights to discharge from custody on [a 
§ 2255] motion because of his inability to be present at the hearing on 
such motion, or for other reasons.”65 The text of the savings clause as 
enacted in § 2255 contains much broader language—a federal prisoner 
does not have recourse to habeas corpus unless § 2255 is “inadequate 
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”66 Courts have inter-
preted this substitution to mean that Congress rejected the narrow 
formulation of the savings clause presented by the Judicial Conference, 
which was concerned with practical considerations.67 Its replacement 
with more expansive language is thought to be indicative of Congress’s 
intent for the savings clause to apply beyond situations of practical dif-
ficulty.68 Beyond this conclusion, however, the legislative history of the 
savings clause does not appear to shed any more light on its scope.69 
                                                                                                                      
61 In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 608. 
62 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
63 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 967–68 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255). The text of the subsection containing the savings clause is 
as follows, with the text of the savings clause itself italicized: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is au-
thorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be en-
tertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by mo-
tion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him 
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to 
test the legality of his detention. 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added). 
64 Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1239, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999). 
65 Hayman, 342 U.S. at 215 n.23 (quoting from the proposed bill). 
66 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241. 
67 E.g., Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 375. 
68 Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 375. 
69 See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241 & n.2. 
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B. Section 2255 After the AEDPA 
 In the 1990s, Congress enacted a sea change in collateral review 
jurisprudence.70 In the days following the Oklahoma City bombing, 
Senator Robert Dole introduced the bill that was to become the 
AEDPA.71 The AEDPA was, in part, a response to the appearance that 
criminals were “gaming the system” by filing numerous “unnecessary 
appeals.”72 As part of the AEDPA, Congress amended § 2255 to restrict 
the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear post-conviction challenges un-
der the statute.73 The legislation added a one-year statute of limitations 
to motions brought under § 2255.74 The AEDPA also amended § 2255 
to require a prisoner bringing a second or successive motion to obtain 
certification from the appropriate court of appeals that the motion 
contained “(1) newly discovered evidence . . . sufficient to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would 
have found the movant guilty or . . . (2) a new rule of constitutional law, 
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 
that was previously unavailable.”75 
 The result of the AEDPA amendments is that there are only three 
ways in which a prisoner can obtain collateral review of a federal convic-
tion and sentence after his or her first § 2255 motion.76 First, a prisoner 
may file a second or successive § 2255 motion after obtaining certifica-
tion that the motion contains newly discovered evidence establishing 
that the movant is not guilty.77 Second, and similarly, a prisoner may file 
a second or successive § 2255 motion after obtaining certification that 
the motion contains a claim based on a new rule of constitutional law 
that the Supreme Court has held to be retroactive.78 If neither of the 
above criteria is satisfied, a court of appeals may not issue the certifica-
tion, and a district court will dismiss the motion for lack of jurisdiction.79 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1310–11. 
71 141 Cong. Rec. 11,407 (1995) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole); see Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
72 141 Cong. Rec. 11,407 (1995) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole) (“[Violent crimi-
nals] can appeal and appeal and appeal in the event they are apprehended, tried and con-
victed—continued appeals for 7, 8, 10, 15 years in some cases.”). 
73 AEDPA § 105; see Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 87. 
74 AEDPA § 105. 
75 Id. 
76 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), (h). 
77 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
78 Id. § 2255(h)(2). 
79 Stanko v. Davis, 617 F.3d 1262, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 2010); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 
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 Even where those requirements are not satisfied, however, a pris-
oner may obtain collateral review of his or her federal conviction or sen-
tence after a prior § 2255 motion by a third means if, for some reason, 
the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality 
of his detention.”80 In that case, he or she may obtain review of his or 
her claims not through § 2255, but by filing a petition for the writ of ha-
beas corpus under § 2241.81 This language is the reason for the outsized 
importance of the savings clause; it transforms the savings clause into a 
catch-all that provides an opportunity for review of a claim that other-
wise would be barred as a successive motion under the AEDPA restric-
tions.82 
 The AEDPA amendment’s addition of the second or successive bar 
was a dramatic break from the preexisting jurisprudence in its restric-
tion of collateral review after a first § 2255 motion.83 The pre-AEDPA 
standards for second or successive § 2255 motions were substantially 
more flexible.84 This earlier jurisprudence permitted federal prisoners 
to file both previously raised claims and unraised claims in a subsequent 
§ 2255 motion, subject to limitation if the claim was considered to be 
“abuse of the writ.”85 The flexibility of pre-AEDPA collateral review is 
illustrated by the fact that the “abuse of the writ” limitation could be 
overcome by a finding that the “ends of justice” required a hearing.86 
 Thus, the AEDPA amendments changed the focus of litigation by 
making dismissal of subsequent § 2255 motions automatic in most cas-
es.87 For movants who could not obtain authorization from a court of 
appeals under the stringent successive motion standards, the motion 
would be summarily dismissed unless the movant could make a claim to 
relief under the savings clause.88 In those situations, the savings clause 
stands as the only means to obtain review of a conviction or sentence 
that may be illegal.89 
                                                                                                                      
80 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
81 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Hack, supra note 19, at 191. 
82 See Hack, supra note 19, at 191. 
83 See Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 87–88. 
84 Id. at 88–89. 
85 Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Pro-
cedure § 28.1, at 1558 (6th ed. 2011). 
86 Id. § 28.1, at 1558–59 & n.11. 
87 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (a second or subsequent § 2255 mo-
tion must be dismissed if it does not meet either the “newly discovered evidence” or the 
“new rule of constitutional law” prongs); Hack, supra note 19, at 179. 
88 See Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 90–91. 
89 See id. 
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II. Attempts to Interpret “Inadequate or Ineffective” 
 The application of the savings clause is limited to circumstances 
where § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality” of a pris-
oner’s detention.90 The meaning of this language, however, is not en-
tirely clear from its terms alone.91 Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
has decided several cases concerning § 2255,92 the Court has never ad-
dressed the scope of the savings clause.93 Accordingly, divining the 
meaning and scope of the savings clause has fallen to the courts of ap-
peals.94 This Part will explore those courts’ attempts to derive a test to 
govern the operation of the savings clause and will examine in depth 
three different tests used by the courts of appeals.95 
 As a beginning point to the analysis of the savings clause, it is im-
portant to note that any interpretation of § 2255 is naturally limited by 
situations where the prisoner can obtain a successive hearing despite 
the AEDPA amendments.96 If a federal prisoner falls into one of the 
exceptions to the successive motion bar—the “newly discovered evi-
dence” prong or the “new rule of constitutional law” prong—the pris-
oner gets to have his or her claim heard on the merits, which would 
eliminate any claim that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of the detention.97 Thus, the statutory interpretation of the sav-
ings clause only comes into play in those situations where a prisoner 
cannot meet the successive motion requirements.98 
 The most frequent claim not covered by exceptions to the second 
or successive bar is a change in statutory interpretation that affects pre-
viously convicted federal prisoners.99 To explain how these types of 
                                                                                                                      
90 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
91 See Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
92 See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 377–78 & n.9 (1977) (interpreting a section 
of the District of Columbia Code that is “almost identical” to § 2255); United States v. 
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210 (1952). 
93 Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 2002). 
94 See Hertz & Liebman, supra note 85, § 41.2[b], at 2134 n.19. 
95 See infra notes 110–191 and accompanying text. 
96 See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1997) (implying that 
there is no need to look to the savings clause if a § 2255 movant can meet either of the 
successive motion prongs). 
97 See Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 89–91. 
98 See id. at 90–91. 
99 See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 581 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[A] new statutory interpre-
tation . . . is neither [newly discovered evidence nor a new rule of constitutional law].”); 
United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 51 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that the petitioner’s claims 
based on a new statutory interpretation were “barred by the AEDPA ‘second or successive’ 
rules”). 
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claims come before courts, it is helpful to look to one case of statutory 
interpretation in particular that spawned many savings clause cases.100 
It is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924 to use a firearm during a 
crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime.101 In 1995, in Bailey v. 
United States, the Supreme Court held that that statute requires that the 
government prove that the defendant actively employed the weapon, 
not just that he or she possessed the weapon.102 A significant number of 
federal prisoners at this time were incarcerated because several circuits 
had interpreted the statute to apply to mere possession of a firearm 
during the predicate crime.103 Yet, according to the Supreme Court in 
Bailey, that action was not criminal under the statute without proof that 
the accused actively employed the weapon.104 
 For those prisoners who had already filed an unsuccessful § 2255 
motion, filing a motion in response to the Bailey decision constituted a 
second § 2255 motion.105 Unfortunately for those prisoners, Bailey 
claims could not meet the stringent gatekeeping restrictions on succes-
sive motions because a Supreme Court interpretation of a substantive 
criminal law is neither newly discovered evidence that would show the 
movant was innocent nor a new rule of constitutional law under 
§ 2255.106 Thus, if such prisoners were to press their claims that the Su-
preme Court had decided that their actions were not actually criminal, 
they had to claim that the savings clause applied to their cases.107 The 
decision of whether the savings clause applied in these cases faced many 
courts of appeals in the years after Congress enacted the AEDPA,108 and, 
in many circuits, it framed the debate about the scope of the savings 
clause.109 
 Despite the fact that similar statutory interpretation claims often 
arise in savings clause cases, the courts of appeals have not defined the 
                                                                                                                      
100 See, e.g., Triestman, 124 F.3d at 365; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 247 (3d Cir. 1997). 
101 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). 
102 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995). 
103 See Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation in Bailey was contrary to the interpretation in several courts of ap-
peals). 
104 See Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 92; Bailey, 516 U.S. at 150. 
105 Hack, supra note 19, at 191. 
106 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 247–48. 
107 See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 900, 901 (5th Cir. 2001); Triest-
man, 124 F.3d at 372–73. 
108 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 85, § 41.2[b], at 2134 n.19 (collecting cases). 
109 See id. 
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contours of the savings clause uniformly.110 Although the exact phras-
ing of each of the tests formulated to govern the applicability of the 
savings clause varies, the formulations endorsed by the circuits can be 
separated into three general tests.111 Those three tests are: (1) the ac-
tual innocence and unobstructed procedural shot test, (2) the constitu-
tional avoidance test, and (3) the initial motion test.112 Examining each 
test separately will illuminate the distinct ways the courts have analyzed 
the savings clause.113 
A. The Actual Innocence and Unobstructed Procedural Shot Test 
 The actual innocence and unobstructed procedural shot test was 
adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit shortly after 
the passage of the AEDPA.114 Subsequently, the test has been adopted 
or cited approvingly by a majority of the courts of appeals.115 As the 
name suggests, the test consists of two prongs: the actual innocence 
prong and the unobstructed procedural opportunity prong.116 
 The actual innocence prong looks to whether the prisoner is mak-
ing a claim that he or she is actually innocent of the crime of convic-
tion.117 Prisoners are not able to access habeas via the savings clause 
unless they can make a colorable claim of actual innocence.118 
 For a definition of actual innocence, courts often reference the 
Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Bousley v. United States, which defined 
actual innocence in a related context concerning procedural default of 
claims made under § 2255.119 In Bousley, the Court held that, in order 
                                                                                                                      
110 Prost, 636 F.3d at 594 (noting division among the circuits in their interpretations of 
the savings clause); Hack, supra note 19, at 191–93. 
111 Prost, 636 F.3d at 584 (applying the initial motion test); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 
F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying the actual innocence and unobstructed procedural 
shot test); Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377 (applying the constitutional avoidance test). 
112 See supra note 111. 
113 See infra notes 114–188 and accompanying text. 
114 See Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting the genesis of the 
test in In re Dorsainvil, its timing shortly on the heels of Bailey, and the enactment of the 
AEDPA). 
115 See Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (9th Cir.); Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 963 (8th Cir.); Reyes-
Requena, 243 F.3d at 904 (5th Cir.); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000); Wof-
ford, 177 F.3d at 1244 (11th Cir.); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611–12 (7th Cir. 1998); In 
re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (3d Cir.). 
116 Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898. 
117 See, e.g., In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 334; Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 
2000). 
118 See Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898–99. 
119 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); see, e.g., Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (9th Cir.); Charles v. 
Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 1999); Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244 n.3 (11th Cir.). 
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to establish actual innocence, the prisoner must show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that “no reasonable juror” would have convicted 
him or her.120 The Court in Bousley also noted that establishing actual 
innocence required showing “factual innocence” and not simply “legal 
insufficiency.”121 Courts have applied this standard to cases in which 
changes in statutory interpretation have rendered the conduct of de-
fendants not criminal.122 
 The inclusion of an actual innocence requirement does not come 
from the text of the provision; there is no reference to “actual inno-
cence” in the subsection of § 2255 containing the savings clause.123 Its 
inclusion may be explained by its close relation to the specific statutory 
interpretation problem posed by Bailey.124 In fact, some courts phrase 
the test as covering a situation where the movant makes a showing that 
a subsequent interpretation has made the movant guilty of a nonexis-
tent offense,125 which seems to be an apt, if specific, description of the 
Bailey problem where a change in statutory interpretation resulted in 
prisoners standing convicted for conduct that was no longer considered 
criminal.126 Similarly, a requirement of actual innocence may be related 
to the innocence required in the “newly discovered evidence” prong 
for a second or successive § 2255 motion.127 
 Courts have found support for implying an actual innocence com-
ponent by noting that Congress, in enacting the AEDPA, meant to limit 
relief under § 2255.128 The actual innocence requirement furthers that 
intent by acting as a limiting factor for a remedy that is intended to be 
rare.129 In addition, courts have considered claims of imprisonment for 
a nonexistent offense to be much more serious than other claims of 
                                                                                                                      
120 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (citation omitted). 
121 Id. 
122 E.g., Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244 & n.3. 
123 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); supra note 63 (reproducing the 
text of the savings clause). 
124 Hack, supra note 19, at 190–91; see supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text. 
125 E.g., Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244 (holding the savings clause applicable where a “Su-
preme Court decision establishes the petitioner was convicted for a nonexistent offense”). 
126 See Hack, supra note 19, at 190–91. 
127 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) (allowing a second or successive motion where a claim 
contains “newly discovered evidence that . . . would be sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the of-
fense” (emphasis added)). 
128 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1308; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 376. 
129 See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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injustice, like sentencing errors, and therefore, particularly deserving 
of a hearing to determine if relief is appropriate.130 
 The second prong of the test looks to whether the prisoner has 
had “an unobstructed procedural opportunity” to have his or her claim 
heard.131 If a prisoner has had a prior unobstructed opportunity to 
raise the claim, then the savings clause will not be open to him or 
her.132 Courts have emphasized that the standard is an opportunity, not 
an actual hearing, and have considered the fact that the prisoner did 
not take advantage of the opportunity to raise a claim to be irrelevant 
for the purpose of the test.133 
 The procedural opportunity must be “unobstructed,” which refers 
to the accessibility of the claim being made.134 A claim may be ob-
structed because the claim had not yet been recognized by the court at 
the time of the hearing or because the claim went against circuit prece-
dent at the time but the precedent was later overruled.135 Either situa-
tion could render an opportunity to raise the claim vacuous.136 
 Just how obstructed the opportunity must be for the purposes of 
the test is an issue that has divided the courts who use this test.137 The 
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have used “unobstructed opportu-
nity” or similar language that is broad enough to include not only cases 
in which the prisoner is dissuaded from bringing the claim because of 
adverse circuit precedent, but also cases in which the prisoner was not 
aware of the claim because it had not been recognized at the time of 
the prior hearing.138 Nevertheless, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Elev-
enth Circuits have all adopted more restrictive language that only en-
compasses cases in which the prisoner’s claim was blocked by circuit 
                                                                                                                      
130 E.g., In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 609–10; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (noting that 
it would be a “complete miscarriage of justice” if the restrictions in § 2255 served to pre-
vent a prisoner from bringing a newly accrued claim that he was imprisoned for acts that 
were not criminal). 
131 Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 963. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.; Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244. 
134 Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2008). 
135 Prost, 636 F.3d at 605–06 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that adverse precedent prevents a meaningful hearing of a claim and noting that 
other circuits have decided the issue in favor of granting a hearing in such a case). 
136 See id. 
137 See id. at 588–89 (majority opinion). 
138 See Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (9th Cir.); Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 960 (8th Cir.); In re Dor-
sainvil, 119 F.3d at 251–52 (3d Cir.) (noting that the prisoner lacked the opportunity to 
raise a claim before the claim was recognized in a subsequent Supreme Court case). 
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precedent at the time of the prior hearing.139 For example, the Fourth 
Circuit breaks the prong into two subsections, requiring (1) that, at the 
time of conviction, circuit or Supreme Court precedent supported the 
conviction, and (2) that the law changed after the movant’s direct ap-
peal.140 This difference appears to reflect a judgment that, although 
prisoners should be held responsible for presenting “novel” legal ar-
guments, they should not be held responsible for presenting arguments 
directly foreclosed by circuit or Supreme Court precedent.141 
 Both the actual innocence and unobstructed procedural opportu-
nity prongs have been subject to criticism.142 The actual innocence 
prong has been attacked as having no textual basis in the savings 
clause.143 In addition, one dissenting judge has argued that there are 
instances where a prisoner could have a claim that, even if the claim 
did not plead actual innocence, would still create constitutional con-
cerns if all review of the claim was denied.144 Accordingly, critics con-
tend that § 2255 should be interpreted to avoid constitutional issues by 
allowing claims to proceed under the habeas statute even when those 
claims do not assert actual innocence.145 
 One court has also attacked the unobstructed procedural shot 
prong for lacking a textual basis in § 2255.146 The Tenth Circuit has 
reasoned that Congress enumerated specific circumstances when a sec-
ond or successive motion should be allowed, and the nonexistence of 
supporting precedents or the existence of precedents adverse to the 
claim are not among them.147 The Tenth Circuit also noted that if a 
prisoner does not bring a claim because it has not been recognized or 
faces adverse circuit precedent, the inability to obtain review does not 
reflect a failure of § 2255, but rather a failure of the prisoner or his or 
her lawyers.148 
                                                                                                                      
139 Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904 (5th Cir.); In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333–34 (4th Cir.); 
Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244 (11th Cir.); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611 (7th Cir.). 
140 In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333–34. 
141 Compare Harrison, 519 F.3d at 959–60 (explaining that “unobstructed” includes situ-
ations where the claim did not exist at the time of the first § 2255 motion), with In re Jones, 
226 F.3d at 333–34 (limiting operation of the savings clause to situations where the claim 
was foreclosed by adverse precedent at the time of the first § 2255 motion). 
142 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 589, 591–92; Hack, supra note 19, 195. 
143 Hack, supra note 19, 195. 
144 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
145 See id.; see also Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377 (reasoning that the savings clause should 
be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions). 
146 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 589. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
2013] Defining the Savings Clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 After AEDPA 369 
B. The Constitutional Avoidance Test 
 The essence of the constitutional avoidance test is that the restric-
tions on successive motions could function to deny collateral review in 
ways that could put the constitutionality of those restrictions in ques-
tion.149 Like the actual innocence and unobstructed procedural shot 
test, the constitutional avoidance test also was enunciated shortly after 
the enactment of the AEDPA.150 In 1997, the Third Circuit noted that 
there was surely a constitutional dimension to any interpretation that 
entirely eliminated collateral review.151 Shortly thereafter, in Triestman 
v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articu-
lated the constitutional avoidance test to determine the applicability of 
the savings clause.152 
 In analyzing the scope of the savings clause, the Second Circuit 
reasoned that several constitutional provisions could be implicated by 
denying collateral review.153 The court noted that the Eighth Amend-
ment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment could be 
implicated by denying collateral review to someone who claimed to be 
innocent of the crime for which he or she was convicted.154 Addition-
ally, the court observed that removing all collateral review could violate 
the Suspension Clause and that a collateral review framework that al-
lowed review in some cases and denied it in others could be unconstitu-
tional on an equal protection basis.155 The Second Circuit declined to 
reach the merits of any of those constitutional claims.156 Rather, be-
cause such serious constitutional issues existed, the court reasoned that 
the savings clause should be interpreted to allow review whenever 
§ 2255 functioned to deny review where such denial would raise “seri-
ous constitutional questions.”157 
 The Second Circuit’s analysis is based on a principle of statutory 
construction known as the canon of constitutional avoidance.158 The 
Supreme Court has explained this “cardinal principle” of statutory con-
                                                                                                                      
149 Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377. 
150 See Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 960 (noting the timing of Triestman and In re Dorsainvil 
shortly on the heels of the enactment of the AEDPA). 
151 In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 248. 
152 Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377. 
153 Id. at 378–79 & nn.21–22. 
154 Id. at 378–79. 
155 Id. at 378–79 nn.21–22. 
156 Id. at 378. 
157 Id. at 377, 380. 
158 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381–82 (2005); Norman J. Singer & J.D. Sham-
bie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:11 (7th ed. 2007). 
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struction, that where “a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised . . . 
[the] Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is 
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”159 
 The fact that certain applications of § 2255 might create constitu-
tional concerns has not gone unnoticed beyond the Second Circuit.160 
The Tenth Circuit has cited the Second Circuit’s constitutional inquiry 
approvingly, noting the validity of considering the constitutionality of 
denying review, but the court chose not to adopt the test and ques-
tioned whether the restrictions in § 2255 could ever raise a serious con-
stitutional question.161 Additionally, other circuits, although not adopt-
ing the test, have recognized a constitutional dimension involved in 
denying review to prisoners, especially when a prisoner has a claim of 
actual innocence.162 
 Nonetheless, the constitutional avoidance test has been roundly 
criticized by other courts of appeals.163 The Seventh Circuit con-
demned the test as “too indefinite” to “meet the needs of practical judi-
cial enforcement.”164 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the “‘se-
rious constitutional question’ standard is only about as definite as a 
‘tough issue’ or ‘hard set of circumstances’ standard would be.”165 The 
Eleventh Circuit has also implied that any constitutional concerns dis-
sipate with the multiple opportunities for review provided by direct ap-
peal and the first round of collateral review, and that such concerns are 
no longer substantial after those opportunities for review.166 
C. The Initial Motion Test 
 Long after the first two tests, the Tenth Circuit set out a new test 
that substantially differed from the previous tests.167 In 2011, in Prost v. 
Anderson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the 
                                                                                                                      
159 United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (internal quo-
tation marks and citations omitted). 
160 See, e.g., Prost, 636 F.3d at 593–94; Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 963; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
at 248. 
161 Prost, 636 F.3d at 593–94. 
162 E.g., Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 963; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 248. 
163 Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903 n.28 (5th Cir.) (noting that although the test func-
tionally takes into account the same considerations as other circuits, its particular formula-
tion “creates the appearance of a standardless test with no limiting principles”); Wofford, 
177 F.3d at 1243 (11th Cir.); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611 (7th Cir.). 
164 In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611. 
165 Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1243. 
166 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1318 (implying that the Suspension Clause does not require 
multiple rounds of review). 
167 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 584, 591, 594. 
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savings clause only applies when a prisoner’s claim could not have been 
brought in an initial § 2255 motion.168 Under the initial motion test, if 
the prisoner could have brought the claim in his initial § 2255 motion, 
the opportunity for habeas review via the savings clause will not be open 
to him or her.169 In some respects, the test is not very different from the 
unobstructed procedural shot prong of the test discussed above.170 
 The initial motion test, however, does differ significantly in how it 
looks at excuses for failing to bring a claim.171 When determining 
whether a prisoner could have brought a claim in an initial § 2255 mo-
tion, the Tenth Circuit held that neither a claim’s lack of prior recogni-
tion nor the fact that it was foreclosed by adverse circuit precedent pre-
vented a prisoner from bringing the claim for the purposes of the 
test.172 What that conclusion means for prisoners is that the failure to 
bring a claim would not be excused in either of those circumstances, 
and thus the mere fact that the circuit later held the specific conduct to 
be noncriminal in these circumstances would not permit the prisoner 
to obtain habeas review via the savings clause.173 
 The Tenth Circuit supported this conclusion by looking to the text 
of the savings clause as well as the surrounding provisions of § 2255.174 
The Tenth Circuit noted that by adding the successive motion bar, 
Congress intended to limit prisoners to one, and only one, § 2255 mo-
tion unless the prisoner pleaded one of the two exceptions that Con-
gress exempted from the rule—either newly discovered evidence or a 
new rule of constitutional law.175 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit rea-
soned that Congress undoubtedly understood that prisoners would 
seek successive motions to test claims other than the ones within the 
two exceptions, yet it chose not to include additional exceptions.176 In 
                                                                                                                      
168 Id. at 584. 
169 Id. 
170 Compare Prost, 636 F.3d at 584 (holding that a prisoner may only utilize the savings 
clause when the claim could not have been tested in an initial § 2255 motion), with Ivy v. 
Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the savings clause is not avail-
able to a prisoner who had an unobstructed opportunity to raise the claim in his initial 
§ 2255 motion). In many cases, the outcome under the two tests would be the same. See 
Prost, 636 F.3d at 584; Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060. What distinguishes the two tests are the accept-
able excuses for not bringing a claim in an initial § 2255 motion. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 588–
89, 591–92; Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960; supra notes 131–141 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the unobstructed procedural shot analysis). 
171 Prost, 636 F.3d at 589–90. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. 
174 Id. at 585. 
175 See id. 
176 Id. 
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this way, Congress created a very limited subset of claims that could be 
tested on a second § 2255 motion and excluded all other claims.177 
Thus, by strictly requiring a prisoner to bring a claim in his or her ini-
tial motion, the Tenth Circuit maintained that it was effectuating Con-
gress’s intent in passing the AEDPA.178 
 The dissent in Prost vigorously disagreed with the majority’s con-
ception of the savings clause.179 The dissenting judge noted that com-
mon sense and the plain language of the statute prevent § 2255 from 
being considered adequate when it functions to deny even an initial 
meaningful hearing of a claim, as it would if a claim was foreclosed by 
adverse precedent when a prisoner’s first § 2255 motion was 
brought.180 The dissent also observed that the initial motion approach 
to the savings clause had not been adopted by any other circuit.181 
                                                                                                                     
 Even before Mr. Prost’s motion arrived at the Fifth Circuit, other 
courts of appeals had criticized this type of approach as too narrow a 
reading of the savings clause.182 These circuits found it necessary to pro-
vide habeas review via the savings clause at least in those cases in which a 
conviction was premised on settled law at the time of conviction, but 
later changes in the law made the prisoner’s conduct not criminal.183 
Several courts have noted that the failure to provide review in such a 
case could give rise to constitutional issues of due process and cruel and 
unusual punishment.184 Aware of this facet of other circuits’ savings 
clause jurisprudence, the Tenth Circuit noted it might be necessary to 
adopt the Second Circuit’s constitutional avoidance approach to sup-
plement the initial motion test in some cases.185 The court, however, 
declined to adopt the constitutional avoidance test in Prost because the 
prisoner failed adequately to allege a constitutional violation.186 
 The Seventh Circuit, in rejecting the approach of the Tenth Cir-
cuit, has noted practical and fairness-based arguments against requiring 
prisoners to bring every conceivable claim against their conviction or 
 
177 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 586. 
178 Id. at 586 n.6. 
179 Id. at 605–06 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
180 Id. 
181 See id. at 604. 
182 See, e.g., Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904; Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244; In re Davenport, 147 
F.3d at 611. 
183 E.g., Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904; Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244; In re Davenport, 147 
F.3d at 611. 
184 E.g., Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 963; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377–79; In re Dorsainvil, 119 
F.3d at 248. 
185 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 593–94. 
186 Id. at 594. 
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sentence in an initial § 2255 motion, which would be the practical re-
sult of the initial motion test.187 The Seventh Circuit has reasoned that 
such a requirement would be a waste of judicial resources and has im-
plied that it would place an unreasonable burden on prisoners chal-
lenging a conviction or sentence.188 
 In sum, the courts of appeals have suggested three tests to define 
the scope of the savings clause: the actual innocence and unobstructed 
procedural shot test, the constitutional avoidance test, and the initial 
motion test.189 Despite their different foci, none has escaped criti-
cism.190 A rigorous examination of each of the tests will show that such 
criticism is warranted.191 
III. Failing to Balance the Savings Clause’s  
Competing Interests 
 All of the attempts by the courts of appeals to define the scope of 
the savings clause are imperfect.192 Evaluating those attempts requires 
that parameters be set out by which one can assess those efforts.193 This 
Part sets out three factors that should be used to evaluate any test that 
governs the operation of the savings clause.194 It then proceeds to eval-
uate the three tests described in Part II in light of those factors.195 
A. Factors for Assessing the Savings Clause 
 In order to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the attempts to 
define the scope of the savings clause, one must consider at least three 
factors.196 First, any definition of the savings clause must align with the 
                                                                                                                      
 
187 See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 610. 
188 See id. 
189 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 584 (the initial motion test); Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (the ac-
tual innocence and unobstructed procedural shot test); Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377 (the 
constitutional avoidance test). 
190 See supra notes 114–188 and accompanying text. 
191 See infra notes 192–294 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra notes 114–188 and accompanying text. 
193 See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 596–97 (10th Cir. 2011) (attacking the concur-
rence and dissent’s interpretation for ignoring the text of the statute and Congress’s in-
tent); id. at 599 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claiming that the 
majority’s interpretation unnecessarily creates constitutional issues). 
194 See infra notes 196–211 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra notes 212–294 and accompanying text. 
196 See Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (utiliz-
ing the concept of finality as embodied in the AEDPA as a guide to interpreting the savings 
clause); Prost, 636 F.3d at 585–87 (reasoning that the text of the savings clause and the 
surrounding sections should be used to determine the appropriate scope of the savings 
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text of the savings clause and should be consistent with the text of the 
surrounding sections of § 2255.197 Statutory interpretation, of course, 
must begin with an examination of the text.198 Where that text is am-
biguous, as is the case with the savings clause, the rest of the statute 
should be considered as an interpretative tool.199 For example, an in-
terpretation will fail if it interprets a provision in a way that nullifies a 
neighboring provision.200 For these reasons, consulting the text of the 
statute is of paramount importance.201 
 Second, any attempt to define the scope of the savings clause 
should also be consistent with the intent of Congress in passing the 
AEDPA.202 It is clear from the legislative history of the AEDPA that 
Congress intended the legislation as a clear break with the status 
quo.203 Specifically, courts have reasoned that, by passing the AEDPA, 
Congress intended to increase finality in criminal convictions and limit 
the discretion of judges to allow § 2255 hearings.204 To the extent that 
the savings clause could be read in a manner that would vitiate Con-
gress’s intent, consideration of the legislative intent should be part of 
any scope analysis.205 
                                                                                                                     
 Third, any definition of the scope of the savings clause must be 
considered in light of the constitutional issues inherent in collateral re-
view.206 The scope and content of collateral review is replete with consti-
tutional issues.207 Because one can assume that Congress did not intend 
to pass legislation that runs afoul of the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has affirmed that, when possible, statutes should be interpreted to 
avoid questions of constitutionality.208 Accordingly, any analysis of the 
 
clause); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (reasoning that the 
savings clause should be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional issues). 
197 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 585–87. 
198 See id. at 584–85; Singer & Singer, supra note 158, § 47:1, at 274. 
199 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 585; Singer & Singer, supra note 158, § 47:2, at 278–80. 
200 See Singer & Singer, supra note 158, § 45:12, at 110–11. 
201 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 585–87 (noting that a close analysis of the text is required to 
avoid an interpretation of the savings clause that nullifies other portions of the statute). 
202 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1312. 
203 See id. at 1310–11; see also 141 Cong. Rec. 11,407–08 (1995) (statement of Sen. 
Robert Dole) (introducing the bill that would become the AEDPA); supra notes 70–75 and 
accompanying text (discussing the changes that the AEDPA brought to § 2255). 
204 See, e.g., Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1310–11; Prost, 636 F.3d at 592. 
205 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). 
206 See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377. 
207 See id. at 378–80 & nn.21–22 (discussing the constitutional issues that can arise in 
regulating collateral review). 
208 United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971); Singer & 
Singer, supra note 158, § 45:11, at 84, 87–88. 
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scope of the savings clause must consider the constitutional provisions 
implicated by collateral review, or the denial thereof.209 
 Satisfying all three of these parameters is no small feat; when taken 
to a logical extreme, any one of the above considerations competes 
with, and may conflict with, the other interests.210 Nonetheless, by bal-
ancing all three factors in interpreting § 2255, the resulting interpreta-
tion will defeat most criticism.211 
B. The Initial Motion Test 
 The Tenth Circuit’s initial motion test limits the operation of the 
savings clause to situations where the claim challenging the legality of 
the detention could not have been raised in an initial § 2255 motion, 
regardless of whether the claim was foreclosed by adverse precedent or 
had not been recognized by the circuit.212 Of the three tests, it is per-
haps subject to the strongest objections.213 Its main fault lies in the fact 
that the formulation favors the legislative intent contained within the 
AEDPA at the expense of the other factors.214 
 In 2011, in Prost v. Anderson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit set out the initial motion test.215 The initial motion test 
strongly embraces the legislative intent of the AEDPA as an interpreta-
tive tool.216 Based on the legislative history, courts have held that the 
purpose of the AEDPA is to ensure a greater measure of finality in crim-
inal convictions.217 Using that intent, the Tenth Circuit created argua-
bly the most restrictive of the three tests embraced by the circuits.218 In 
being so restrictive, the test satisfies one of the factors in that it is con-
                                                                                                                      
209 See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377–78. 
210 See infra notes 212–294 and accompanying text. 
211 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1312; Prost, 636 F.3d at 585–87; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377. 
212 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 584, 589–90; supra notes 167–178 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the initial motion test as enunciated by the Tenth Circuit). 
213 Prost, 636 F.3d at 603–04 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that no other circuit has read the savings clause as restrictively as the majority). 
214 See id. at 587 (majority opinion) (reasoning that viewing § 2255 in the context of the 
AEDPA amendments provides support for its interpretation). But see id. at 605–07 (Seymour, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for taking a crabbed 
view of the text of the savings clause and creating “serious constitutional concerns”). 
215 Id. at 584 (majority opinion). 
216 Id. at 585–87. 
217 See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998); Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1310; see al-
so 141 Cong. Rec. 11,407–08 (1995) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole) (offering the spon-
sor’s view that the bill that would become the AEDPA would reduce the duration of collat-
eral review of criminal convictions). 
218 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 603–04 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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sistent with the legislative intent of the AEDPA, namely to increase fi-
nality in criminal convictions.219 
 When examining the test in light of the other interests relevant to 
any interpretation of the savings clause, however, the test does not 
measure up as well.220 Looking first at the test’s fidelity to the text of 
§ 2255 and the surrounding sections, the Tenth Circuit in Prost focused 
more on the restrictions on second and successive motions than on the 
text of the savings clause itself.221 The actual text of the savings clause 
reads that a prisoner will not be allowed to file a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus “unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is in-
adequate or ineffective to test the legality of his [or her] detention.”222 
The most logical reading of that language is that the “remedy by mo-
tion” referred to in the statute is the judicial review that results from 
the prisoner’s motion to set aside his or her sentence.223 It is that review 
which would or would not be adequate and effective to “test the legality 
of [the] detention.”224 
 This reading of the statute undermines any claim that the initial 
motion test is a faithful interpretation of § 2255.225 Contrary to the rea-
soning of the Tenth Circuit in Prost, the restrictions contained within 
§ 2255 can cause the judicial review of the claim to be inadequate, like 
where a prisoner was convicted for conduct that is no longer criminal 
and the restrictions serve to deny any hearing.226 By emphasizing the 
restrictions on successive motions, and rejecting the possibility that the 
restrictions themselves can cause the motion to be inadequate, the 
Tenth Circuit’s initial motion test embraces the second or successive 
                                                                                                                      
219 See id. at 588 (majority opinion). 
220 See id. at 605–07 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
221 See id. at 584–86 (majority opinion); see also Hack, supra note 19, at 195–96 (noting 
that the language of the savings clause undermines any claim that Congress intended to 
eliminate all successive motions other than those contained within the exceptions). 
222 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see supra note 63. 
223 See id.; Prost, 636 F.3d at 605–06 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
224 See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the “essential 
function” of collateral review is to provide a judicial hearing on the legality of the pris-
oner’s conviction and sentence). 
225 Prost, 636 F.3d at 605–06 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(expressing skepticism that the harsh outcomes that result from the test conform to the 
text of § 2255). 
226 See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 610–11 (arguing that the successive motion restric-
tion operated to prevent the prisoner in question from ever getting a hearing on a claim 
that went to the fundamental legality of his sentence). 
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restrictions, but restricts the operation of the savings clause beyond 
what the plain language of the text most logically suggests.227 
 Looking next at the constitutional issues that might arise as a result 
of the application of the initial motion test, the consequences are simi-
larly problematic.228 Under the initial motion test, a prisoner who can 
claim actual innocence based on a later statutory interpretation that 
made his or her conduct not criminal would have no opportunity for 
judicial review if he or she had already filed one § 2255 motion, regard-
less of his or her reason for not bringing the claim in the prior mo-
tion.229 
 Outside the Tenth Circuit, several courts maintain that such a de-
nial of review would raise serious questions about the constitutionality 
of § 2255.230 At the very least, where an actually innocent prisoner is 
deprived of any opportunity to receive a judicial hearing of his or her 
claim, there is a possibility of a due process violation because such a 
situation could violate a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”231 Yet 
the initial motion test makes this outcome exceedingly likely by holding 
prisoners responsible for bringing all claims in an initial motion, in-
cluding claims that were foreclosed by adverse circuit precedent at the 
time of the initial motion.232 In addition to due process concerns, such 
a situation could raise an Eighth Amendment issue in that continued 
                                                                                                                      
227 See id. at 605, 606 & n.7. 
228 See id. at 599. 
229 See id. 
230 See, e.g., Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–79 (noting that Eighth Amendment and Due 
Process issues may arise if collateral review were unavailable); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 
248 (“Were no other avenue of judicial review available for a party who claims that s/he is 
factually or legally innocent as a result of a previously unavailable statutory interpretation, 
we would be faced with a thorny constitutional issue.”). 
231 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted). 
232 See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 610, 611 (implying that it is unreasonable to require 
prisoners to bring every conceivable claim against their conviction or sentence at the risk 
of losing the ability to ever have those claims heard). This was the case in Bailey v. United 
States, where, in 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute making it a federal 
crime to use a firearm during a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime required that 
the government prove that the defendant actively employed the weapon, contrary to the 
law in several of the circuits. 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995). The result was many prisoners left 
imprisoned for conduct that was non-criminal, but who had already filed one § 2255 mo-
tion. See Hack, supra note 19, at 190–91. 
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imprisonment of an actually innocent individual might constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment.233 
 Perhaps realizing this aspect of its decision, the Prost court cited 
approvingly, but did not adopt, the constitutional avoidance test.234 Al-
though such a two-part test would solve the constitutional objections to 
the formulation, the test is still subject to criticism as to the court’s in-
terpretative analysis.235 Cases abound in which there is a claim of actual 
innocence that only accrues after an initial § 2255 motion.236 The statu-
tory interpretation in Bailey resulted in a wave of prisoners with just 
such a predicament.237 To the extent constitutional issues could arise in 
such a scenario, they might not be isolated circumstances, but could be 
a widespread phenomenon, making the initial motion test particularly 
problematic.238 
C. The Constitutional Avoidance Test 
 The Second Circuit’s constitutional avoidance test allows prisoners 
recourse to habeas review via the savings clause where a prisoner is pre-
vented from bringing his or her claim under § 2255 and such a denial 
of review presents “serious constitutional questions.”239 Although the 
constitutional implications of failing to provide review have been noted 
by many courts, other circuits have not adopted the constitutional 
                                                                                                                      
233 Triestman, 124 F.3d at 379. The Second Circuit has also noted that a Suspension 
Clause issue could arise when removing all opportunity for judicial review of a claim of 
actual innocence, but the court chose not to use it in its analysis because of the “limited 
reading [the Suspension Clause] has been given in recent years.” Id. at 378 n.21. It bears 
noting that this case was decided before Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008). In 
2008, in Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Suspension Clause 
guarantees noncitizens held outside of the sovereign territory of the United States the 
privilege of invoking the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 770–71. One would imagine that this 
development might change the Triestman court’s assessment of the Suspension Clause. See 
Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378 n.21. 
234 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 593–94. The court declined to adopt the constitutional avoid-
ance test in this case because the movant had not adequately briefed the argument that 
the unavailability of habeas would offend the Constitution. Id. at 594. The court, however, 
did evince some doubt as to whether the operation of the savings clause could ever violate 
the Constitution. See id. 
235 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 605–06 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); supra notes 215–233 and accompanying text. 
236 Hack, supra note 19, at 190–91 (noting that a “host” of prisoners made Bailey claims 
following that case). 
237 Id. 
238 See Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing the litiga-
tion that ensued following the Bailey decision). 
239 See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377; supra notes 149–159 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the constitutional avoidance test as enunciated by the Second Circuit). 
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avoidance test and, in fact, other courts have strongly criticized the test 
as not lending itself to judicial enforcement.240 
 If the constitutional avoidance test does one thing well, it is insulat-
ing § 2255 from any concerns that its restrictions may violate constitu-
tional provisions that are implicated by restricting collateral review.241 By 
allowing habeas review via the savings clause whenever a “serious consti-
tutional issue” is raised, the test assures that the provisions of § 2255 
cannot serve to violate any constitutional imperatives, at least insofar as 
the constitutional issue arose from a denial of review.242 
 This test too, however, fares less well when assessed in regard to the 
other interests tied up in the interpretation of § 2255.243 Looking first 
at the formulation’s connection to the text of the savings clause and the 
surrounding sections, the link is tenuous.244 Again, the text of the sav-
ings clause allows for the prisoner to file a habeas petition only when it 
“appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of [the] detention.”245 There is nothing in the text that di-
rectly links the “inadequate or ineffective” standard to a requirement 
that a “serious constitutional question” be presented.246 Although 
surely there is considerable overlap between the inadequate or ineffec-
tive standard and the constitutional standard formulated by the Second 
Circuit, the test could be underinclusive in that there may be some cir-
cumstances where the remedy is inadequate, but the denial of review 
does not rise to the level of a serious constitutional issue.247 Accord-
ingly, the proffered test does not fit comfortably with the text of the 
statute.248 
 The constitutional test also conflicts with the legislative intent of 
the AEDPA.249 Apart from ensuring finality in criminal convictions, the 
                                                                                                                      
240 See, e.g., Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 903 n.28 (5th Cir. 2001); Wof-
ford, 177 F.3d at 1243; In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611. 
241 See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–79 & nn.21–22 (discussing the various constitutional 
issues implicated by collateral review that could require habeas review via the savings 
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242 See id. at 377. 
243 See Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903 n.28; In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611. 
244 See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1243; In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611; supra note 63. 
245 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
246 See id. § 2255; see also Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1243 (“[T]here is no apparent logical or tex-
tual nexus between the crucial ‘inadequate or ineffective’ language of § 2255 and the diffi-
culty of any constitutional issue that may arise because of that language’s interpretation.”). 
247 See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611 (“Even if the purpose of the ‘adequacy’ escape 
hatch in section 2255 was and is to preserve whatever constitutional right there may be to 
habeas corpus, the escape hatch is not worded so narrowly.”). 
248 See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1243; In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611. 
249 See Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903 n.28. 
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AEDPA clearly was meant to remove discretion from judges in granting 
§ 2255 hearings on successive motions.250 Whereas before the AEDPA, 
judges retained discretion to hear successive motions, the AEDPA 
amendments significantly curtailed that discretion.251 Despite that de-
velopment, the undefined boundaries of the “serious constitutional 
issue” standard would return broad discretion to judges to grant habeas 
hearings pursuant to the savings clause.252 For that reason, some courts 
of appeals have not been receptive to this return of discretion, one de-
scribing it as “squishy”253 and another noting that it does not “meet the 
needs of practical judicial enforcement.”254 Part of that discomfort may 
be due to the fact that reposing discretion limited only by a vague stan-
dard appears contrary to the intent of the AEDPA.255 Therefore, in ad-
dition to its tenuous connection with the text, the constitutional avoid-
ance test is not entirely consistent with the congressional intent behind 
the enactment of the AEDPA.256 
D. The Actual Innocence and Unobstructed Procedural Shot Test 
 The actual innocence and unobstructed procedural shot test, in its 
simplest form, asks whether the prisoner (1) is making a claim of actual 
innocence and (2) has been given an unobstructed procedural oppor-
tunity to raise that claim.257 Several courts of appeals have narrowed 
the second prong to include only those circumstances where the pris-
oner’s opportunity to present his or her claim was obstructed by ad-
                                                                                                                      
250 See Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 104. 
251 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (providing the only excep-
tions to the successive motion bar with no discretion to district or court of appeals judges), 
with Hertz & Liebman, supra note 85, § 28.1, at 1558–59 (describing the permissive pre-
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252 See Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903 n.28 (noting that the formulation “creates the ap-
pearance of a standardless test with no limiting principles”). The extent to which such discre-
tion would exist with such a standard is easily illustrated by looking to the relative assessments 
of majorities and dissents of constitutional claims in savings clause cases. Compare Gilbert, 640 
F.3d at 1316–18 (declining to recognize a Suspension Clause violation in denying review), 
with id. at 1329–30 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Suspension Clause had been 
violated by denying review), and id. at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting) (same). 
253 Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1315 n.19. 
254 In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611. 
255 See Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903 n.28; Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 104. 
256 See supra notes 243–255 and accompanying text. 
257 See Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006); supra notes 114–141 and 
accompanying text (discussing the actual innocence and unobstructed procedural shot 
test). 
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verse circuit precedent that was later overturned.258 This test, in its two 
variations, is the most widely used, having been adopted by the majority 
of the circuits.259 
                                                                                                                     
 Looking first at the test’s connection to the text of the statute, it is 
clear that one prong has a closer connection than the other.260 The ac-
tual innocence prong has an attenuated relationship to the text of the 
savings clause, which makes no reference to actual innocence as a trig-
ger for review.261 One scholar has noted that there could well be in-
stances where claims of actual innocence were not presented but 
§ 2255 was still inadequate to test the legality of the sentence.262 In-
deed, the use of the word “detention” in the saving clause seems to im-
ply that the savings clause is concerned with more than the legality of 
just the conviction.263 The actual innocence inquiry goes to the merits 
of a claim against the legality of a conviction, rather than the adequacy 
of § 2255 as a remedy, which, by the terms of the statute, is the focus of 
the savings clause.264 
 The second prong, which forecloses habeas review via the savings 
clause to prisoners who have had an unobstructed procedural shot at 
presenting their claim, bears a stronger relation to the text of § 2255.265 
There is a clear logical relation between the inability to have a claim 
heard and the adequacy and effectiveness of the remedy to test the le-
gality of detention.266 Where restrictions within the statute prevent a 
prisoner from having any unobstructed opportunity to present a claim 
that goes to the legality of his or her conviction or sentence, that would 
seem to be the exemplary case in which the remedy is inadequate to 
test the legality of the detention.267 
 
258 Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904 (5th Cir.); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 
2000); Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244 (11th Cir.); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611–12 (7th Cir.). 
259 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted or cited approvingly the actual 
innocence and unobstructed procedural shot test). 
260 See infra notes 261–276 and accompanying text. 
261 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (providing that a court will not 
hear a petition for habeas corpus filed by a prisoner unless “the remedy by motion is in-
adequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the] detention”). 
262 Hack, supra note 19, at 195. 
263 See id. at 195–96. 
264 See id.; see also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 609 (noting that a sentencing claim can 
“go to the fundamental legality of [a] sentence[]”). 
265 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. 
266 See Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
at 251. 
267 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. 
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 The variation of the unobstructed procedural shot test, which lim-
its the savings clause to instances where the claim is foreclosed by ad-
verse circuit precedent, has slightly less textual basis.268 That variation 
closes the door to habeas review via the savings clause in all other cir-
cumstances where a claim was not brought in a prior motion, such as 
where the circuit had not recognized the claim until after the initial 
motion.269 The question with this variation is whether § 2255 can be 
inadequate where an argument is not foreclosed by circuit precedent, 
but merely has not been successfully raised by a litigant and recognized 
by the circuit.270 The Tenth Circuit stated with some force that, textu-
ally speaking, the failure is with the prisoner (or the prisoner’s counsel) 
for not considering and raising a novel argument.271 Yet the further 
implication that § 2255 can be inadequate only where a claim was fore-
closed by circuit precedent seems somewhat strained.272 One could im-
agine a case in which a prisoner was barred from raising a claim that 
had just recently been recognized and went to the fundamental legality 
of his or her sentence.273 Under such a circumstance, it is hard to imag-
ine that such a denial of review would be adequate to test the legality of 
the detention.274 One circuit has recognized that § 2255 could be in-
adequate in just such a situation.275 For this reason, the limited variant 
of the unobstructed procedural shot test seems to ascribe a narrower 
definition to “inadequate” than a natural reading would suggest.276 
 Looking at the next factor, the actual innocence and unobstructed 
procedural shot test aligns well with the legislative intent of the AEDPA 
to streamline the collateral review process and increase finality in crim-
inal convictions.277 The actual innocence prong serves as a limiting fac-
                                                                                                                      
268 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 960 
(9th Cir. 2008); supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text (discussing the different in-
terpretations of how unobstructed a claim must be to satisfy the unobstructed procedural 
shot prong). 
269 See In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333–34. 
270 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. 
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tor that automatically closes the door to any motion that does not in-
clude a claim of actual innocence.278 Yet, the prong allows arguably the 
most egregious injustices—claims that a prisoner is actually innocent of 
the crime of conviction—to receive a hearing.279 These two factors are 
consistent with the AEDPA amendments’ apparent intent to restrict, 
but not totally eliminate, review under § 2255.280 Combining the actual 
innocence with the unobstructed procedural shot prong, in either vari-
ation, strengthens this alignment by ensuring that the savings clause 
will not allow prisoners to make repeated motions based on the same 
claims.281 When the two prongs of the test are viewed in concert, it is 
clear that the actual innocence and unobstructed procedural shot test 
is well constructed to embody the change in collateral review that the 
AEDPA represented.282 
 When, however, the actual innocence and unobstructed proce-
dural shot test is assessed in terms of possible constitutional issues that 
might arise, it fares less well.283 The actual innocence prong, although 
conforming to the purpose of the AEDPA, closes the door to any claim 
against a conviction or sentence that does not entail a claim of actual 
innocence.284 This result seems to be based on the assumption that the 
denial of review could raise constitutional issues only where there is a 
claim of actual innocence.285 Although surely the imprisonment of an 
innocent person would raise the most serious constitutional concerns, 
it does not follow that such issues exist only where there is a claim of 
                                                                                                                      
278 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1323 (holding that the savings clause does not apply to sen-
tencing claims that do not include a claim of actual innocence); Stephens, 464 F.3d at 899 
(holding that the savings clause does not apply to faulty jury instruction claims that do not 
raise a factual innocence claim). 
279 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. 
280 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); supra notes 202–205 and accompanying text (discussing the 
legislative intent behind the passage of the AEDPA). Section 2255(h) bars successive motions 
except in cases in which new evidence suggests actual innocence or a new rule of constitu-
tional law affects the legality of the detention, two circumstances that arguably protect against 
the most serious injustices: the incarceration of an actually innocent person or a person held 
in violation of his or her constitutional rights. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 586 n.6. 
281 Gilkey, 314 F.3d at 836 (noting that Congress, by passing the AEDPA, intended to 
limit collateral review to an initial § 2255 motion). 
282 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (noting that the application of the test would not 
undermine the restrictions added by the AEDPA amendments). 
283 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
284 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1323; Stephens, 464 F.3d at 899. 
285 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1312, 1315–16 (noting that no circuit has found a violation of 
the Suspension Clause where a court denied review of a sentencing claim, which, by defini-
tion, lacks a claim of actual innocence). 
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actual innocence.286 There clearly is a difference between someone 
who, for example, is actually innocent of a crime and is serving a five-
year sentence, and someone who is guilty of the same crime and who 
was erroneously sentenced to ten years instead of five.287 Yet both pris-
oners are wrongly imprisoned, and the fact that one of the prisoners 
was wrongfully convicted changes the severity of the prisoners’ constitu-
tional claims, but not the existence of those claims.288 
 Unlike the actual innocence prong, the unobstructed procedural 
shot prong of the test does not add to the likelihood that the test would 
run afoul of constitutional provisions.289 Constitutional concerns 
linked to an application of § 2255 by and large stem from a denial of 
review.290 In its broadest form, requiring an unobstructed procedural 
opportunity to have a judicial determination of a claim would seem to 
dissipate any constitutional issues.291 
                                                                                                                     
 In sum, the actual innocence and unobstructed procedural shot 
test, as with the two preceding tests, cannot satisfy all of the interests 
involved in interpreting § 2255.292 Although the test aligns with the leg-
islative intent of the AEDPA, it fares less well considering its textual ba-
sis and constitutional concerns.293 Because none of the tests that have 
been adopted by the circuits have successfully navigated all three inter-
ests, one must look elsewhere to locate a test that better addresses these 
considerations.294 
 
286 See id. at 1329–30 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Suspension Clause has 
been violated by denying review on a sentencing claim); id. at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissent-
ing) (same). 
287 In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 609–10, 611 (comparing a sentencing claim to a claim of 
actual innocence). 
288 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 
610–11. 
289 See Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903 n.28 (noting that the constitutional avoidance test 
is based on the same principles as the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit’s unobstructed proce-
dural shot test). 
290 See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–80 & n.21–22 (citing Due Process, Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, Equal Protection, and Suspension Clause issues that could arise from denying 
review, and holding that providing a hearing would avoid those issues). 
291 See id. at 380. 
292 See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–80 & n.21–22; Hack, supra note 19, at 195–96; supra 
notes 212–291 and accompanying text. 
293 See Gilkey, 314 F.3d at 836; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–80 & n.21–22. 
294 See infra notes 295–354 and accompanying text. 
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IV. Striking the Right Balance 
 From the analysis above, it is clear that each of the tests adopted by 
the courts of appeals is problematic when it comes to at least one of the 
interests involved in defining the proper scope of the savings clause.295 
This Part posits a new test to define the scope and govern the operation 
of the savings clause; it then examines that test in light of the parame-
ters considered in Part III.296 
 A modified unobstructed procedural shot test would more appro-
priately define the scope and operation of the savings clause.297 The 
modified unobstructed procedural shot test uses the unobstructed pro-
cedural shot analysis adopted by a number of circuits but eliminates the 
actual innocence requirement.298 The test allows a prisoner to file a 
petition for the writ of habeas corpus via the savings clause when the 
prisoner has a claim against the legality of his or her detention and has 
not had an unobstructed procedural opportunity to raise the claim be-
cause of the second or successive bar or for some other reason.299 The 
test considers a claim obstructed when a claim is not brought either 
because it has not been recognized by the circuit or because it was fore-
closed by circuit precedent.300 This Note argues that, assessed against 
the three interests relevant to the interpretation of the statute, the 
modified unobstructed procedural shot test performs better than any 
of the alternatives adopted by the circuits.301 
A. The Text of the Savings Clause and Surrounding Sections 
 The modified unobstructed procedural shot test is consistent with 
the language of the savings clause and the surrounding sections of the 
statute.302 The savings clause conditions the availability of habeas cor-
                                                                                                                      
295 See supra notes 212–293 and accompanying text. 
296 See infra notes 297–354 and accompanying text. 
297 See infra notes 298–300 and accompanying text. 
298 See Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006); Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 
F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2004); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 
2001); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 
1244 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611–12 (7th Cir. 1998). 
299 See Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2008). 
300 See id. 
301 See infra notes 302–350 and accompanying text (arguing that the text of the savings 
clause and surrounding sections, the legislative intent evinced in passing the AEDPA, and 
the constitutional issues inherent in collateral review are factors that should be considered 
in interpreting the scope of the savings clause). 
302 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 
(3d Cir. 1997); supra note 63. 
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pus on the “remedy by motion” being “inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of [the] detention.”303 That provision does not contain ex-
clusions or qualifications, which suggests that anything could cause the 
review to be inadequate or ineffective, including a provision of the stat-
ute itself.304 Thus, a close reading of the text of the savings clause sug-
gests that that language contemplates the possibility that the provisions 
of the statute could render the remedy inadequate or ineffective.305 
 The modified unobstructed procedural shot test takes this into 
account and focuses on whether the motion provides an opportunity 
for every claim to be heard.306 Where the restrictions within § 2255 re-
sult in a prisoner having never received an unobstructed opportunity to 
raise a claim, the motion has been insufficient to test the legality of the 
detention.307 Simply stated, the motion is inadequate and ineffective to 
test the legality of the prisoner’s detention exactly because it has failed 
to provide any hearing for a claim that challenges the legality of the 
conviction or sentence.308 Accordingly, by linking habeas review via the 
savings clause to the lack of a prior opportunity for a hearing, the mod-
ified unobstructed procedural shot test provides a concrete and faithful 
embodiment of the generally phrased “inadequate or ineffective” lan-
guage of the savings clause.309 
 The test also does not conflict with the neighboring restrictions on 
successive § 2255 motions imposed by the AEDPA amendments.310 Af-
ter an initial § 2255 motion, the test only allows claims to be brought 
that could not have been presented previously.311 Thus, the test pre-
vents exactly what the successive motion bar sought to eliminate: pris-
oners filing repeated motions arguing the same claim or withholding 
claims in order to receive multiple rounds of judicial review.312 Because 
the test furthers the purpose which motivated the successive motion 
bar, it cannot be claimed that it interferes with the restrictions added by 
the AEDPA amendments.313 
                                                                                                                      
303 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
304 See id. 
305 See id. § 2255(e), (h). 
306 See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584 (10th Cir. 2011). 
307 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. 
308 See id. 
309 See id. 
310 See id. 
311 See Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003). 
312 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251; Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 87–88. 
313 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251; Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 87–88. 
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 The modified test also improves on the test adopted by several of 
the circuits by eliminating the actual innocence prong.314 The actual 
innocence prong has been used to limit the operation of the savings 
clause to only the most egregious injustices of wrongful imprison-
ment.315 As discussed above, however, it lacks any textual link to the 
savings clause itself, and it is not implied by the surrounding statutory 
sections.316 For that reason, savings clause tests that include an actual 
innocence exception impose a restriction that is divorced from the ac-
tual language of the statute in order to enforce a more ambiguous and 
less logically grounded legislative intent.317 
 The modified unobstructed procedural shot test thus embraces the 
plain text of the savings clause and remains true to the successive mo-
tion restrictions.318 As a result, it satisfies the first and primary consid-
eration in interpreting § 2255, consistency with the text of the statute.319 
                                                                                                                     
B. The Legislative Intent of the AEDPA Amendments 
 In passing the AEDPA, Congress clearly meant to effect a change 
in the status quo of collateral review.320 Any judicial interpretation of 
the savings clause should be cognizant of that intent and not interpret 
the savings clause so as to eviscerate it.321 
 The modified unobstructed procedural shot test is consistent with 
the legislative intent behind the enactment of the AEDPA.322 Perhaps 
the strongest and most specific intent behind the passage of the AEDPA 
was the intent to limit successive § 2255 motions.323 This intent was em-
bodied in the restrictions that bar successive motions, subject to only 
two exceptions.324 The modified unobstructed procedural shot test 
 
314 See Hack, supra note 19, at 195–96. 
315 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. 
316 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Hack, supra note 19, at 195–96 (dis-
cussing the atexual nature of an actual innocence requirement for the savings clause); 
supra notes 260–264 and accompanying text (same). 
317 See Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Martin, J., dissenting). 
318 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (applying an unobstructed procedural shot anal-
ysis and noting that it is consistent with the successive motion restrictions). 
319 See Prost, 636 F.3d at 584–85. 
320 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1310–11; see also 141 Cong. Rec. 11,407–08 (1995) (statement 
of Sen. Robert Dole) (stating his intent to change the then-existing law of collateral review 
through passage of AEDPA). 
321 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. 
322 See id. 
323 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1310–11. 
324 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
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keeps the teeth in the successive motion restrictions.325 The test re-
serves habeas review via the savings clause for only those claims that 
have not been presented previously.326 In so doing, the test prevents the 
abuses sought to be curtailed by the restrictions: relitigation of claims 
that have already been decided, and prisoners withholding claims in an 
attempt to assure multiple hearings.327 
 The AEDPA also was meant to limit the discretion that federal 
judges exercise in hearing successive motions.328 The unobstructed 
procedural shot test limits such discretion by looking to the relatively 
objective question of whether the prisoner has had a prior, unob-
structed procedural opportunity to raise his or her claim.329 As such, it 
is more in line with the legislative intent behind the AEDPA than the 
constitutional avoidance test, which gives judges significant discretion 
to determine what constitutes a “serious constitutional question.”330 
 Some might argue that Congress in enacting the AEDPA may have 
intended to eliminate a broader swath of successive motions than 
would receive review under the unobstructed procedural shot test.331 
One scholar, however, has noted that arguments for such an intent are 
belied by the continued existence of the savings clause itself.332 A read-
ing of § 2255 that denies habeas review based on an argument that the 
AEDPA strictly disallows review of successive motions ignores the plain 
meaning of the savings clause and the logical inference supplied by its 
continued existence after a major overhaul of the statutory scheme.333 
                                                                                                                      
325 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. 
326 See Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060 (applying the unobstructed procedural shot test to deny 
access to the savings clause where the prisoner could have brought the claim previously). 
327 See id. (denying access to the savings clause because the claim could have been 
brought previously); cf. Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2000) (interpreting 
§ 2255 in a similar fashion as the unobstructed procedural shot test, though not explicitly 
using any recognized test, to deny access to the savings clause where a claim had been 
previously reviewed and denied). 
328 Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 104. 
329 See Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060 (applying the unobstructed procedural shot test by looking 
to whether a prisoner could have raised the claim in a trial, direct appeal, or initial § 2255 
motion). 
330 See supra notes 249–256 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between the 
constitutional avoidance test and the legislative intent behind the AEDPA). Compare Ivy, 
328 F.3d at 1060 (considering the application of the savings clause in light of the possibility 
of bringing claims during a trial, direct appeal, or initial § 2255 motion), with Triestman, 
124 F.3d at 379–80 (determining whether the savings clause applies by relying on whether 
“serious constitutional questions” would result from denial of review). 
331 See Hack, supra note 19, at 192, 195. 
332 See id. at 195–96. 
333 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1332 (Martin, J., dissenting); Hack, supra note 19, at 195–96. 
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C. The Constitutional Interests in Collateral Review 
 There are many constitutional provisions that can be implicated by 
the granting or denial of a collateral review hearing.334 The Supreme 
Court has noted that the savings clause insulates § 2255 from many of 
those constitutional questions.335 Interpreting the savings clause with-
out due consideration of those constitutional provisions would risk vio-
lating the constitutional rights of prisoners,336 would conflict with rules 
of statutory interpretation,337 and would contradict relevant Supreme 
Court precedent.338 
 The unobstructed procedural shot test satisfies many, if not all, of 
the constitutional concerns connected to the operation of § 2255.339 It 
has been noted that the unobstructed procedural shot test is governed 
by the same principles as the constitutional avoidance test.340 What is 
meant by that conclusion is that the two tests address latent constitu-
tional issues in collateral review in the same way.341 Of all the constitu-
tional provisions that have been cited as being implicated in decisions 
concerning collateral review—the Due Process Clause, the Eighth 
Amendment, the Suspension Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause— 
all are implicated by the denial of a meaningful round of collateral re-
view.342 The unobstructed procedural shot test avoids running afoul of 
those provisions by allowing habeas review via the savings clause for all 
claims that could not have been brought previously and otherwise 
would not be heard, thus ensuring a meaningful opportunity for collat-
eral review of every claim.343 
 Further, the modified unobstructed procedural shot test’s more 
expansive definition of “unobstructed” also eliminates constitutional 
concerns.344 The test embraces a broader definition of “obstructed” that 
                                                                                                                      
334 Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 378–79 & nn.21–22 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 
the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, the Suspension Clause, and the Equal 
Protection Clause as possibly implicated by denial of collateral review). 
335 Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 
223 (1952). 
336 See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
337 See Singer & Singer, supra note 158, § 45:11, at 87. 
338 See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971); Gilbert, 640 
F.3d at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
339 See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–79 & nn.21–22. 
340 See Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903 n.28. 
341 See id. 
342 See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–79 & nn.21–22 (noting that all constitutional issues 
considered by the court were linked to the denial of a hearing). 
343 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. 
344 See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–79 & nn.21–22. 
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includes claims not brought either because of adverse circuit precedent 
or lack of recognition of the claim by the circuit.345 One could imagine 
a case in which either situation—the existence of adverse precedent or 
the absence of recognition of a claim—would excuse the failure to have 
brought a claim previously and where § 2255 would be inadequate if its 
terms prevented a hearing on that claim.346 If a movant was denied a 
hearing in spite of having such an excuse, the lack of review would also 
threaten constitutional violations.347 For this reason, the definition of 
unobstructed used by the modified unobstructed procedural shot test 
works to diminish the likelihood that the test would offend the Constitu-
tion.348 
 Accordingly, the modified unobstructed procedural shot test fore-
stalls any constitutional issues by providing review in cases in which the 
denial of review could create constitutional issues.349 The test operates 
to give every claim that a prisoner may have a meaningful hearing, and 
in doing so, eliminates the commonly cited constitutional concerns 
that have been linked with denying § 2255 review.350 
 In conclusion, the unobstructed procedural shot test, decoupled 
from an actual innocence requirement, best navigates the competing 
interests involved in determining the scope of the savings clause.351 The 
test is faithful to the text of the savings clause without undermining the 
restrictions included in the statute.352 The test also aligns with the legis-
lative intent that motivated the passage of the AEDPA.353 Finally, the 
test avoids constitutional issues that plague other tests by always allow-
ing an opportunity for review of a claim against the legality of a convic-
tion or sentence.354 
Conclusion 
 The savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is often the only means for a 
federal prisoner to get a second round of collateral review of his or her 
conviction or sentence. Yet, the key language of the savings clause— 
                                                                                                                      
345 See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. 
346 See id.; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 378–79 & nn.21–22. 
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triggering habeas review when the remedy provided by § 2255 is “in-
adequate or ineffective to test the legality” of the detention—has not 
been interpreted definitively. At least three tests have been utilized by 
the courts of appeals: the constitutional avoidance test, the actual inno-
cence and unobstructed procedural shot test, and the initial motion 
test. Evaluating those tests in light of the interests relevant to interpret-
ing § 2255—the text of the statute, the legislative intent that undergirds 
the AEDPA, and the constitutional concerns relevant to collateral re-
view—demonstrates that all three tests are fundamentally flawed. In-
stead, this Note proposes using an unobstructed procedural shot test 
without any actual innocence requirement to determine the operation 
of the savings clause. Such a test is consistent with the text of § 2255, 
the legislative intent of Congress, and the constitutional imperatives 
inherent in collateral review. 
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